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HUMPHREY v. LANGFORD*
TRANSIENT JURISDICTION
REAFFIRMED
INTRODUCTION

Bowling is now a contact sport. A facetious statement, of
course, but a proper categorization of a recent Georgia Supreme
Court decision, Humphrey v. Langford.' The "contact" is the
mere physical presence of the defendant in a state, which tradi2
tionally has been sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction.
This rule-"the power theory" of jurisdiction-was first enunci3
ated in Pennoyer v. Neff.
In Pennoyer, Justice Field limited state court jurisdiction to
persons and property physically present in the state.4 Field established three categories of judicial action: in personam, which
imposes personal liability upon the defendant; in rem, which declares the rights of all persons to a thing; and quasi in rem,
which declares the rights of particular persons to a thing.5 As a
result of Pennoyer, in personam jurisdiction could be based
upon the defendant's mere presence in the state. Jurisdiction
based upon mere presence, or transient jurisdiction, 6 is con* Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
1. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
2. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971). "[A] state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory, whether
permanently or temporarily." Id.
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Pennoyer was an ejectment action brought in federal court under the
diversity jurisdiction. Pennoyer, the defendant in that action, held the
land under a deed purchased in a sheriff's sale conducted to realize on a
udgment for attorney's fees obtained against Neff in a previous action
by one Mitchell. At the time of Mitchell's suit in an Oregon State court,
Neff was a nonresident of Oregon. An Oregon statute allowed service
by publication on nonresidents who had property in the State, and
Mitchell had used that procedure to bring Neff before the court. The
United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, in which Neff
brought his ejectment action, refused to recognize the validity of the
judgment against Neff in Mitchell's suit, and accordingly awarded the
land to Neff.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1977).
4. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
5. Id. at 727.
6. According to the transient rule, anyone present in the state is subject to its jurisdiction whether he is permanently or only temporarily there.
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 30 at 103 (1959).
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ferred upon the state in transitory actions7 without regard to the
contacts of that state with either the subject of the case or the
parties. Once the defendant is found in the state, personal service is sufficient notice of the suit to satisfy due process
8
requirements.
Though Pennoyer was intended to restrict state court jurisdiction, it became the rationale supporting jurisdiction over defendants not present in the forum state. 9 Increasing interstate
travel and the growth of multistate corporations left many defendants outside the reach of Pennoyer's grasp. Consequently,
the courts created concepts of fictional presence to obtain jurisdiction over defendants who had physically left the forum
state. 10 During this period of expanding jurisdiction, courts
never questioned the power of a state court over an individual
who was physically present and properly served within the
1
state.
Corporations, however, posed a unique problem. The prevailing legal thinking held that a corporation existed only as a
fictional entity in the state of its incorporation. 1 2 This view provided unsatisfactory results, as it allowed corporations to escape
jurisdiction when doing business outside the state of its incorporation. 13 InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington14 addressed this
7. "Transitory actions are those founded upon a cause of action not
necessarily referring to or arising in any particular locality. Their characteristic feature is that the right of action follows the person of the defendant." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1343 (5th ed. 1979).

8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877).
9. Note, Civil Procedure-Conceptsof Personal JurisdictionBefore &

After Shaffer v. Heitner, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 285, 287 (1978) [hereinafter cited

as Civil Procedure-Concepts].
10. See generally Note, Developments in the Law State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1960). See, e.g., Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352

(1927). Under a theory of implied consent, the Court upheld a state statute
conferring jurisdiction over nonresident motorists for claims related to their
use of the state's highways. But see Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928),
which held unconstitutional a statute similar to the one in Hess, but which
did not expressly require the state official to forward process to the
defendant.
11. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1065 at
217 (1969) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER].
12. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of
law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and
is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence.
Id. at 588.
13. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 11, § 1066 at 219.
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Supreme Court allowed the State of Washington to exert jurisdiction over a company incorporated in Delaware with
its principal place of business in Missouri. The company conducted no
business in Washington except for the activities of its salesmen, who solicited orders there.
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problem and extended state court jurisdiction to individuals and
corporations having certain "minimum contacts" with the forum
state. The contact was sufficient if jurisdiction based upon it
would comport with notions of "fair play and substantial justice."' 5 State legislatures codified the International Shoe holding, thereby establishing statutory categories of minimum
contacts. 16 InternationalShoe departed from, but did not abandon, Pennoyer'sconceptual basis. The minimum contacts analysis was intended to augment the power theory, not replace it.
Actual presence continued to satisfy due process regardless of
the quality and nature of the activity.' 7 Courts continued to recognize service of process within the state as sufficient for jurisdiction even if the state had no connection with the
controversy.' 8
An extension of Pennoyer's power theory allowed quasi in
rem jurisdiction to be based upon the presence of the defendant's intangible property within the forum. 19 This rationale
15. 326 U.S. at 316.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
Id.
16. See Sorg, World-Wide Volkswagen: Has the United States Supreme
Court taken the Illinois Civil PracticeAct Section 17-1(b) Out of the Gray
Zone?, 80 S. ILL. U.L.J. 137, 139 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sorg]. Illinois
enacted one of the first "long arm" statutes. The Illinois Civil Practice Act
§ 1-1(b) states:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting;
(e) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage and legal separation the maintenance in this State of matrimonial domicile.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100, § 17.1 (1979).
17. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
18. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959),
where service of process upon the defendant was effected in an airplane
over the state. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdictio: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE U.J. 289
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MINN. L. REV. 146 (1932).

19. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Epstein, a Maryland resident, had
an alleged claim against Balk, a North Carolina resident. Harris, also a
North Carolina resident, owed Balk a small sum of money. When Harris
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granted jurisdiction over the attachment of a debt owed to the
defendant in the form of an insurance policy. Even in the wake
of InternationalShoe, an insurer's contingent contractual obligation to defend and indemnify the insured was held capable of
attachment. 20 Commentators criticized such assertions of quasi
in rem jurisdiction for failing to evaluate the relationship between the forum, the defendant, and the controversy-factors
International Shoe deemed essential to due process when the
defendant was not personally served in the forum. 21 The U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the validity of quasi in rem jurisdic22
tion in Shaffer v. Heitner.
Until Shaffer, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted state court
jurisdiction to be asserted anywhere the defendant was physically present or had sufficient minimum contacts and anywhere
his property could be said to be located. In Shaffer, the Court
was faced with a situation where quasi in rem jurisdiction appeared particularly harsh.23 The trial and appellate courts rejected the defendant's argument that the attachment violated
their due process rights because of their lack of sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy InternationalShoe requirements. 24 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that jurisdiction based upon
the statutory presence of a nonresident's stock was unconstitutional. The Court stated that an assertion of jurisdiction over
property is essentially an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property. Consequently, the minimum contacts test is
25
crucial to any due process evaluation.
was temporarily in Maryland, Epstein attached the debt to Balk through
Harris. The Court held that the debt was Balk's intangible property and
that the situs of that property traveled with Harris, the debtor. By obtaining jurisdiction over Harris, Epstein gained jurisdiction over Balk even
though Balk himself was not present in Maryland.
20. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 232 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1966).
A New York resident sued a Canadian for injuries sustained in Vermont.
Jurisdiction was based upon the attachment in New York of an insurance
olicy issued to the defendant in Canada by an insurance company doing

usiness in New York.
21. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 668, 671-77 (1975).
22. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Plaintiff Heitner brought a shareholders derivative suit in Delaware against 28 nonresident corporate directors. None of

the alleged misconduct took place in Delaware, nor did the defendants have
any other contacts with Delaware. Jurisdiction was based on a Delaware
statute which provided that any stock in a Delaware corporation could be
attached to allow quasi in rem jurisdiction against its owner.
23. 433 U.S. at 193. The primary purpose of the statute was to force the
defendant to make a general appearance. No limited appearance was permitted. No relationship of any kind was required between the property and
the cause of action.
24. Id. at 193, 194.
25. Id. at 207.
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The precise holding in Shaffer and the narrow interpretation espoused by the concurring judges should involve little or
no disruption of in personam jurisdiction.2 6 However, Justice
Marshall stated: "We therefore concluded that all assertions of
state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny. ' 27 Although dicta, this language has been broadly interpreted by
legions of commentators who consequently regard Shaffer as
the obituary for transient jurisdiction. 28 Scholars argue that
since the mere presence of property is insufficient for jurisdiction, an individual's mere presence must also be insufficient ab29
sent an International Shoe minimum contacts analysis.
Humphrey v. Langford3 ° indicates that state courts have not
been swayed by this analogy and that they will require a
Supreme Court mandate before denying jurisdiction based on
physical presence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Edwin and Faye Humphrey owned a business incorporated
and operated in South Carolina. In August, 1973, the Humphreys contracted with Ervin Langford to sell Langford the business. 3 1 At the time of sale, all parties were South Carolina
residents. 32 After the sale was completed a dispute arose with
regard to some of the contract terms and the Humphreys left the
business' employ. 33 Subsequently, they moved to Bryan
26. Civil Procedure--Concepts,supra note 9, at 299. The Court was
unanimous in holding that jurisdiction based on the statutory presence of
stock within the state is unconstitutional. Narrowly interpreted, this means
due process is denied only if the assets are intangibles unknowingly located
in the forum or if the defendant is denied a limited appearance.
27. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (emphasis added).
28. See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrantfor the Transient
Rule ofIn PersonamJurisdiction?25 VnL. L. REV. 38 (1979-80) [hereinafter
cited as Bernstine]; Nordenberg, State Courts,PersonalJurisdictionand the
Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw.

587 (1979) [hereinafter cited as

Nordenberg]. Contra, Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 15, 24 (1978).

29. Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: PersonalJurisdictionAfter Shaffer and
Kulko and a Modest PredictionRegarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.v.

Woodson, 20 ARiz.L. REV.861, 865 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods]; see

Ehrenzweig, supra note 19. See also Vernon, Single-FactorBases of In Per-

sonam Jurisdiction-ASpeculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978
WASH. U. L. Q. 273 (suggesting the inadequacy of the Pennoyer principles of
exclusive sovereignty as the basis for a system of jurisdiction in a mobile
society).
30. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
31. Brief for Appellant at 6, Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273
S.E.2d 22 (1980).
32. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
33. Brief for Appellee at 2, Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d
22 (1980). A full statement of facts was not perfected in the trial record.
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County, 34Georgia and brought an action concerning the
contract.
In March 1979, Langford was in Georgia to bowl at one of
Savannah's bowling alleys. While bowling he was personally
served with the complaint and summons in this action.3 5 Langford was a resident of South Carolina and the Humphreys lived
36
in Georgia when the suit was brought.
THE COURTS' OPINIONS

Relying on Shaffer, the trial court held that the Georgia statute conferring jurisdiction over Langford was unconstitutional
and dismissed the action.3 7 The trial court stated that jurisdiction based solely on temporary presence was inconsistent with
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 38 Since
the constitutionality of a state statute was involved,39the case
was appealed directly to the Georgia Supreme Court.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, rejecting Shaffer based analogies equating the presence of
property and individuals.40 The court stated that absent a U.S.
Supreme Court mandate, there are compelling reasons to uphold transient jurisdiction. First, the elimination of transient ju41
risdiction would deny plaintiffs equal protection of their rights.
Second, some defendants have no identifiable place of residence
where they may be served, and therefore they may avoid justice
if they cannot be sued where they are found4 2 Third, since
states provide some services for all persons, such as fire and police protection, fairness requires those persons also be amenable to that state's judicial system.43
ANALYSIS

Humphrey v. Langford" is the most recent decision in a line
of Georgia cases which have upheld the transient rule.45 Com34. Id. at 3.
35. Brief for Appellant at 6, Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273
S.E.2d 22 (1980).
36. Id.
37. GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-202 (1971). "The jurisdiction of this state and its
laws extend to all persons while within its limits, whether as citizens,
denizens, or temporary sojourners." Id.
38. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
39. Brief for Appellant at 5, Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273
S.E.2d 22 (1980).
40. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980).
41. Id. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 735, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
44. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
45. McPherson v. McPherson, 238 Ga. 271, 232 S.E.2d 552 (1977) (defend-
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mon law notwithstanding, the Georgia law is clear. By statute, a
nonresident, by his mere presence in the state, is subject to the
state's jurisdiction.46 Even after Shaffer, the Georgia Supreme
Court has upheld transient jurisdiction without questioning the
sufficiency of due process for the defendant. 47 The Humphrey
court evaluated the due process issue, and, nevertheless, upheld
the transient rule.
Initially the court based its reasoning on InternationalShoe
v. Washington." Since International Shoe does not question
the assertion of jurisdiction based on mere presence, it supports
the Humphrey decision. International Shoe mandates a minimum contacts analysis only as an alternative to actual presence. 49 The minimum contacts test supplements the presence
presence when sufficient minimum
test by implying a fictional
50
contacts are established.
The post-InternationalShoe viability of the transient rule is
evidenced by its application even in some unusual situations.
The rule has been applied to grant state court jurisdiction over a
person aboard an aircraft flying through navigable air space 51
and over a nonresident lunching in the forum state.5 2 Another
court simply upheld the rule as "black letter law"-arguments
ant served in a Georgia airport where he had stopped to change planes and
meet his wife); Ward v. Ward, 223 Ga. 868, 159 S.E.2d 81 (1968) (jurisdiction
over an Alabama citizen personally served while sojourning in Georgia);
Miller v. Miller, 216 Ga. 535, 118 S.E.2d 85 (1961) (jurisdiction over a nonresident personally served while temporarily in Georgia).
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-202 (1971). See note 37 supra.
47. Chalfant v. Rains, 244 Ga. 747, 262 S.E.2d 63 (1979). Service was upheld on a Colorado resident in an alimony action fied by an Illinois resident. The defendant objected to jurisdiction on the basis that he was in

Georgia on business unrelated to the suit. Alternatively, he argued that
Georgia had no jurisdiction over a claim of alimony fied by a nonresident
against a nonresident. The court rejected both arguments, stating that the
latter related to subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Id. at
748, 262 S.E.2d at 63.

48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
49. 326 U.S. at 316.
50. Nordenberg, supra note 28, at 595. "Rather than superceding what

had gone before, the minimum contacts test was created as a tool for further expansion of state court jurisdiction ...based upon 'power over property,' and distinctions between in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem

retained their vitality." Id.
51. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). See note 18
and accompanying text supra. In Grace, the court stated that a person
moving in interstate commerce was present in the state regardless of the
mode of transportation. While the court conceded that the defendant's
presence in the state may be of a lesser duration in some cases, it was held
to be a difference without a distinction. Id. at 447.

52. Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963). An Iowa

resident employed by a village located partly in Iowa and partly in Minne-
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that the rule violated the defendant's due process rights were
53
dismissed as being unsupported by judicial authority.
While the Humphrey decision fits comfortably within these
post-InternationalShoe cases, it is significant for its construction of Shaffer. The Humphrey court limited the application of
the Shaffer holding to intangible property therefore sustaining
personal presence as a valid jurisdictional basis.5 4 The Georgia
court was not receptive to extending the Shaffer minimum contacts analysis to in personam jurisdiction.5 5 Since jurisdiction
based upon physical presence was not an issue in Shaffer, the
Humphrey court simply saw no implication for transient jurisdiction resulting from Shaffer. However, given the strictures
Shaffer placed on quasi in rem jurisdiction, an in depth analysis is required to support any decision favoring transient
jurisdiction.
The Humphrey court provided little analysis, ignoring the
support for the transient rule discussed in Shaffer. In part four
of the Shaffer opinion, Justice Marshall refers to physical presence in evaluating the defendants' minimum contacts. 56 He suggests that actual presence is still the best contact and that if the
defendants had been present in Delaware no minimum contacts
analysis would be necessary. This language exempts transient
jurisdiction from the opinion's earlier mandate for a minimum
57
contacts analysis in every assertion of jurisdiction.
More to the point, Justice Stevens' concurrence in Shaffer
supported transient jurisdiction with his expectation argument.5 8 He stated that by visiting a state a defendant knowingly
sota was served when he stopped for lunch on the side of the village located
in Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction.
53. Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976). The defendant, a Vermont citizen, was served in New Hampshire while on business
unconnected to the cause of action. The trial court held for the defendant
but the Court of Appeals reversed, upholding jurisdiction.
54. Civil Procedure-Concepts,supra note 9, at 299.

55. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980).
56. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
Appellants' holdings in Greyhound do not, therefore, provide contacts
with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that State's
courts over appellants. If it exists, that jurisdiction must have some
other foundation.
Appellee Heitner did not allege and does not now claim that appellants have ever set foot in Delaware ....
Nevertheless, he contends
that appellants' positions as directors ...
provide sufficient

contacts....
Id. (emphasis added).
57. Nordenberg, supra note 28, at 630. The author suggests that the
Court is indicating a preference for "traditional" contacts by restricting the
application of the minimum contacts analysis. Id.
58. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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assumes the risk that the state will exercise power over him.
Hence, Stevens concluded, the due process requirement of fair
notice is satisfied.
Shaffer insists upon a relationship, or nexus, between the
forum, the subject matter and the parties, to insure the defendant sufficient notice.5 9 It is questionable whether the nexus is
required when there is actual presence. Shaffer poses no constitutional bar to the exercise of full in personam jurisdiction over
corporations which meet the InternationalShoe formula of continuous activity in the forum. 60 In order to measure continuous
activity, the "doing business" test has been used almost exclusively since International Shoe to establish jurisdiction when
the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's activity in the
forum. 61 By statute, a foreign corporation is "doing business" in

the forum state if it does such business as to render itself "present" in the state. 62 The doing business test has continued to be
63
sufficient for in personam jurisdiction even after Shaffer.
Thus, the Humphrey court could have concluded that if the
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning
that a particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign. IfI visit another State, or acquire real estate or open
a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the State will

exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977). See Del. Code Ann., Tit.
10 § 366 (1975). Pursuant to this statute, plaintiff Heitner filed a motion for
an order of sequestration of the defendant's Delaware stock. The defendants were notified of the pending action by both registered mail and by publication. Pursuant to the sequestration order approximately 82,000 shares of
Greyhound stock having a value of $1.2 million were seized. No relationship
of any kind was required between the property and the cause of action
before jurisdiction was conferred. Probably because of this type of statute,
Justice Marshall found the attachment of intangible property unconstitutional since the defendants would have no expectation of being haled into
court. 433 U.S. at 216 (1977). See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
60. Glen, An Analysis of Mere Presenceand Other TraditionalBases of
Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607, 610 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as
Glen]. Contra,Werner, Dropping the OtherShoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the
Demise of Presence-OrientedJurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L.REV. 565, 595

(1978-79). The author states that after Shaffer there is no longer any single
link between the defendant and the forum state which will support jurisdiction without considering its significance to the cause of action.
61. GLEN, supra note 60, at 610.
62. R. LEFLAR, AMERiCAN ComImcTs LAw 58-59 (1968). See MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-1-27, 79-1-29 (1972). Mississippi law provides for service upon any
corporation found doing business in Mississippi, whether the cause of action occurred in the state or not.
63. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy, 579 F.2d 194, 200-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978). In O'Connor the court held quasi in rem jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant's insurer in New York. Shaffer was distinguished
by asserting that the action at bar was really against the insurer, not the
insured. Contra, Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see note 81 and accompanying text infra.
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"nexus" is not required once a corporation has established its
fictional presence via minimum contacts, then it should follow
that a "nexus" is not required for an individual once actual presence is established.
The Humphrey court failed to note that the "nexus" requirement has been rejected even for quasi in rem jurisdiction. In
Feder v. Turkish Airlines,6 quasi in rem jurisdiction was al-

lowed over a bank account established by the defendant
though it was unrelated to the cause of action. Relying
Justice Stevens' expectation argument,65 the Feder court
jected the defendant's claim that the mere presence of the
count did not constitute the requisite contact mandated
66

alon
reacby

Shaffer.

It is unclear from either Feder or Justice Stevens whether
the attachment of intangibles knowingly located in the forum
state is an exception to Shaffer and thus indicates remaining vitality for the presence theory, or whether it is an application of a
minimum contacts approach. The Humphrey court completely
overlooked both of these arguments. If Feder is explained as an
exception to Shaffer and justified by the state's power over prop67
erty, the transient rule might survive in the in personam area.
The Humphrey court could have cited some recent cases in
support of transient jurisdiction. 68 Post-Shaffer support for the
64. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Feder, a federal district court
acquired quasi in rem jurisdiction in a wrongful death action against a foreign airline for a death which occurred in Turkey by plaintiffs attachment
of the airline's New York bank account.
65. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
66. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The case at bar cannot be compared to either Harris or Shaffer. The
attachment in this case arises neither from the unpredictable visitations of [defendant's] debtor, nor from the statutory scheme of a state
into which [the defendant] never set foot. The attachment arises from
a commercial bank account which [the 'defendant] voluntarily opened
in New York for the furtherance of its business. It is not necessary that
the property attached be related to the underlying cause of action; jurisdiction quasi in rem, at least in [type II actions], requires no such
showing.
Id. Contra, Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co., 96 Misc. 2d 808, 409
N.Y.S.2d 581 (1978). Relyin* on Sha4'er, the court stated that the mere presence of property is insufficient for jurisdiction without a relationship with
the litigation.
67. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv.
33, 76 (1978).
68. Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285
(1979). Plaintiff, a Wisconsin corporation, sought to recover the amount of a
debt owed by an Oklahoma corporation and an individual defendant, an
agent of the corporation. Plaintiff served defendant, a nonresident, while
defendant was temporarily in Wisconsin. See also Aluminal Indus., Inc. v.
Newtown Commercial Assoc., No. 80 Civ. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1980). The
defendant was charged with negligently installing a sprinkler in Connecti-
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transient rule is found in Oxman's Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer.69 In dicta, the court stated that physical presence was not
controlled by a minimum contacts analysis.70 The facts of the
case did not require a decision on the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction since the defendant was an agent whose activities fulfilled the minimum contacts requirements. The court

analyzed jurisdiction under both mere presence and minimum
contacts and found each standard satisfied.
Consistent with their treatment of Shaffer, the Humphrey
court refused to consider the possible implications of other postShaffer cases relied upon by defendant Langford. The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized a substantial shift from a
mechanical application of minimum contacts towards a consideration of fairness to the defendant.7 1 In another case, the U.S.
Supreme Court has cautioned against the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation when there is no expectation that the goods will enter the forum state. 72 It is argued that
these cases evidence a trend of requiring substantial contact
jurisdiction fails because
with the state and, therefore, transient
73
substantial.
not
is
the contact
Since none of these cases involved a defendant served in
the forum, the Humphrey court quickly distinguished them.
The court ignored the fact that these cases, nevertheless, place
cut. Plaintiffs are residents of Connecticut. Newtown is a limited partnership organized under New York law with its principle place of business in
Florida. The court upheld service of process as the New York airport stating that the demise of the transient rule is unsupported by judicial
authority.
69. 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
70. Id. at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287. The court stated that Shaffer did not
mandate a minimum contacts requirement for jurisdiction over a natural
person personally served within the state.
71. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The Court held
that a nonresident does not acquire minimum contacts with California
merely by permitting his minor daughter to go there to live with his estranged wife. Therefore, the wife, a California resident, could not assert in
personam jurisdiction over the father who was in New York.
72. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The
Court denied Oklahoma state court jurisdiction over a New York corporation which did not do any business in Oklahoma. It was stated that the
defendant's contacts with Oklahoma were not such that it could anticipate
being haled into court there. The possibility that the defendant might derive revenue from a car ultimately used in Oklahoma was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction.
See Sorg, supra note 16 at 144.
73. Brief for Appellee at 18. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273
S.E.2d 22 (1980). See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, the
Court struck down quasi in rem jurisdiction obtained by attaching a nonresident's insurance proceeds. Rush belongs to the Shaffer-based line of
decisions quashing jurisdiction obtained by the attachment of intangibles.
It may be viewed as support for a required relationship between intangible
property and the cause of action.
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visible limitations upon the application of the minimum con-

tacts test. In doing so, the court failed to intelligently rebut the
arguments for requiring a relationship with the forum in addition to mere presence. The Humphrey court should have rea-:
soned that while these cases signal a retrenchment from
expanding jurisdiction via minimum contacts, their application
to transient jurisdiction is tenuous. 74 If minimum contacts are
used to construct a fictional presence, actual presence would
seem to be outside the purview of its analysis.
The Humphrey opinion is inadequate, no matter how technically correct, to justify itself. In distinguishing Shaffer, the
Humphrey decision rests on mere factual differences rather
than analysis. The Georgia court made no attempt to ferret out
the Supreme Court's attitude regarding in personam jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision never evaluates the transient
rule vis a vis due process requirements.
EFFECT AND POSSIBLE IMPACT

The Humphrey decision represents how firmly traditional
power concepts are entrenched into American law. To date, no
frontal attack on the transient rule has been successful. The

Humphrey court's attitude is a good indication that states will
not relinquish power over personal presence without a Supreme
Court mandate. 75 Apparently, the state courts are psychologically unable to limit their own authority in civil actions while
their criminal jurisdiction remains unquestioned. Additionally,
there is a common sense appeal to the argument that even a
and services withmere visitor cannot accept a state's protection
76
out accepting reciprocal responsibilities.
Courts which continue to apply presence based jurisdiction
will point to, as did Humphrey, its efficiency. As Powell suggested in Shaffer, the risk of an incorrect decision is small and
outweighed by the reduced burden on the courts to examine an
additional jurisdictional test.77 Ultimately, it is difficult to distin-

guish between the constant and the occasional visitor.78
The Humphrey opinion ignored the possible inequities of
maintaining transient jurisdiction after Shaffer. One commentator states the more limited in rem action will be measured by a

74. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
75. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734, 273 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1980).
76. 246 Ga. at 735, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
77. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
See Note, Jurisdiction a Methodological Analysis: Implicationsfor Presence and Domicile as JurisdictionalBases, 53 WASH. L. REV. 537, 553-54
(1978).
78. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734, 273 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1980).
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stricter due process standard than the broader in personam action.79 Admittedly, if the transient rule is not abrogated, cases
where presence is the only contact may produce some troublesome results. Grace v. MacArthur80 is precisely the type of factual situation that reflects the rule's unforgiving nature.
However, if the dearth of actual cases challenging the rule is indicative of the infrequency with which such cases arise, perhaps
the critics have little to fear. If such assertions are rare, elimination of the rule would have little practical effect. Yet, by maintaining the rule, justice may be possible for certain difficult
cases. 81
Regardless of whether or not the transient rule survives
Shaffer, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should continue
to be used to promote fairness. The doctrine was initially formulated as an antidote to the transient rule and designed to
limit the plaintiff's choice of forum without permitting the defendant to escape his obligations. 82 It should be remembered,
however, that the court's use of the doctrine is discretionary,
and unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
83
plaintiff's choice of forum will rarely be disturbed.
The Humphrey decision shows that the transient rule is
alive and well in Georgia. As Mark Twain would say, the reports
of its death have been greatly exaggerated. Until the Supreme
Court mandates otherwise, it seems clear that a due process attack on transient jurisdiction will be unsuccessful. Humphrey is
a warning to all would be defendants to watch where they are
going.
MargaretMary Drewko

79. Bernstine, supra note 28, at 65. The author suggests the continuance
of transient jurisdiction will create an anomaly. An in personam action,
which subjects the defendant to unlimited liability, will be applied with
fewer contact requirements that an in rem action, which limits the defendant's laibility to the value of the property under the court's jurisdiction.
80. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark., 1959). See note 51 and accompanying
text supra.
81. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734, 273 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1980).
82. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 18, at 292. The author considers forum
non conveniens as necessary to protect the defendant from the harshness
of the transient rule.
83. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).

